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0. Introduction 
Recent studies have revealed some of the early historical circumstances of the 
Sautrāntika tradition, including its relation to the earlier Dārṣṭāntika.1 Under the 
hypothesis of a possible transmission of thought from Vasubandhu (5th cent.) 
downward2 we may further include Dignāga (6th cent.), Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) 
and their successors in the Sautrāntika lineage. The present paper deals with the 
Sautrāntika philosophical system of these later masters, more specifically with 
their following two theories, according to which: (a) conditioned things (saṃ-
                     
* An earlier version of this paper was read at Harvard University on March 26, 2004 
under the title, “Buddhist inquiries into the nature of an object’s determinate existence 
in terms of space, time and defining essence.” I am deeply indebted to the colleagues 
there, L. van der Kuijp, P.G. Patil and L. McCrea, for their valuable comments, which 
helped me to review the subject in a clearer perspective. My thanks are also due to 
H. Ogawa, K. Yoshimizu and T. Fujii for their suggestions concerning my reading of 
the texts cited below. Finally, I owe my sincerest thanks to R. Prévèreau and T. Tille-
mans for improving the English of that paper.  
The bold type in all citations is used to highlight the term deśakālaniyama and its syno-
nyms. 
1 See Katō (1989: 68–92), Mimaki (1988: 227–230), Cox (1995) and, in particular, the 
articles introduced by Kritzer (2003) in the Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies 26/2, 2003, “The Sautrāntikas.”  
2 Regarding the theoretical influence of Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika positions on Dignā-
ga’s and Dharmakīrti’s ontology, epistemology and apoha theory, see, e.g., Frauwall-
ner (1959), Katsura (1969), Hattori (1977ab), and Harada (1989). The sources of Dhar-
makīrti’s proof of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) can also be traced to Vasubandhu’s 
works, in addition to some texts of the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra traditions. See, e.g., 
Steinkellner (1968), von Rospatt (1995) and Yoshimizu (1999). 
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skta), being produced (ktaka) by their own cause, exist in reality, whereas 
unconditioned things (asaṃskrṭa) such as space (ākāśa) are unreal; and (b) 
conditioned things are exclusively impermanent (anitya) and momentary 
(kṣaṇika).3 
 With Dharmakīrti, theory (a) came to involve a clear epistemological as 
well as ontological distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned 
in that it was connected with Dignāga’s declaration that the two kinds of valid 
cognition (pramāṇa), i.e., direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumā-
na), take respectively the individual (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānya-
lakṣaṇa) as their objects.4 Since conditioned things, in addition to being pro-
duced by causes, become condition (saṃskāra) and produce their own effect, 
Dharmakīrti and his successors asserted that (a') only things capable of produc-
ing an effect (arthakriyāsamartha) exist in reality. And since only the individ-
ual (svalakṣaṇa) has such a causal efficacy, only the individual is real, in con-
trast with the universal (sāmānya or sāmānyalakṣaṇa), which is merely im-
agined and causally inefficacious.5 
 Dharmakīrti further bound this definition of the real to theory (b), whereby 
in the course of the so-called sattvānumāna, i.e., the inference of momentari-
                     
3 About the basic Sautrāntika tenets, see, e.g., Mimaki (1989: 233 infra). For Kritzer 
(2003: 206), in the AKBh the theory (a), according to which the unconditioned is un-
real, is attributed to both the Dārṣṭāntika and the Sautrāntika traditions. 
4 PSV ad PS I 2 (Hattori 1986: 79 n. 1.14): na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat pra-
meyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ hi pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam iti 
pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ. “For there is no other object of cognition apart from the individual 
and the universal, since we will prove that direct perception and inference have the 
individual and the universal as their [respective] objects.” 
5 See, e.g., PV I 166abc: sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ. “Only the 
thing which is capable of producing an effect is ultimately existent.” PVSV 84,5f. ad I 
166: idam eva hi vastvavastunor lakṣaṇaṃ yad arthakriyāyogyatā’yogyatā ca. “For the 
capability and the incapability to produce an effect are indeed the [respective] charac-
teristics of the real entity and the unreal entity.” PV III 3: arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad 
atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //. “That which is 
capable of producing an effect is here designated as ultimately existent. The other is 
designated as conventionally existent. They are [respectively] the individual and the 
universal.” NB I 12–15: tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam // yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsaṃ-
nidhānābhyāṃ jñānapratibhāsabhedas tat svalakṣaṇam // tad eva paramārthasat // 
arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ //. “The [perception] has the individual as its 
object. The thing which appears to a cognition differently according to whether it is 
placed near or far is the individual. This alone is ultimately existent, since the real 
entity is characterized as being capable of producing an effect.” 
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ness from existence, he precluded permanent things from the domain of real 
entities, arguing that (b') a non-momentary thing does not exist in reality since 
it has no ability to produce an effect, so that whatever is existent (sat) is there-
fore exclusively momentary (kṣaṇika).6 
 A conditioned thing thus obtains a variety of qualifications in Dharmakīrti’s 
system: Whatever is conditioned (saṃskta) is produced (ktaka), conditioning 
(saṃskāra), causally efficacious (arthakriyāsamartha), existent (sat), a real en-
tity (vastu), an external object (bahirartha), an individual (svalakṣaṇa), imper-
manent (anitya), and momentary (kṣaṇika). Later Tibetan thinkers grouped 
these qualities under the concept of “ultimate reality” (paramārthasatya, don 
dam bden pa).7 And indeed, these qualities can all apply to what the Sautrāntika 
called a real existent. But for Dharmakīrti, as theories (a') and (b') suggest, 
these qualities are equivalent not merely because they refer to the real, but be-
cause they all illustrate the fact that in order to be real a thing must have causal 
                     
6 See, e.g., PV I 269ab: sattāmātrānubandhitvān nāśasyānityatā dhvaneḥ. “Sound is 
impermanent, since the perishing occurs with the mere existence.” HB 4*,6f.: yat sat 
tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ hīyate. “What-
ever is existent is exclusively momentary since, if it were nonmomentary, it would be 
excluded from being a real entity because of its contradiction with causal efficacy, [for 
a real entity] is characterized by having this [causal efficacy].” For studies of the sat-
tvānumāna, see, e.g., Steinkellner (1968), Oetke (1993), von Rospatt (1995: 5ff.), Halb-
fass (1997) and Yoshimizu (1999 and 2003b). 
7 Cf. the classification in Rigs gter rang 'grel 19a2f. (176-2) cited in Dreyfus (1997: 
77) and Yoshimizu (2003a: 364 n. 36): rang gi mtshan nyid dang / gsal ba dang / dngos 
po dang / rdzas dang / log pa dang / don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus 
pa rdzas phan tshun ma 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bu grub pa / skyes bu thams cad kyi 
blang dor bya ba'i 'jug yul yin pas dngos po'i don du don gcig pa yin te … / spyi dang 
gzhan sel dang / ldog pa dang / rnam gcod dang / 'dres pa dang / 'brel pa dang / kun 
rdzob ces bya ba sogs pa ni / don la mi gnas pa / dngos por ma grub pa / dbang po'i yul 
ma yin pa blos sgro btags pa / brtags pa'i chos dngos po la don byed mi nus pa / gzhan 
sel gyis 'brel pa dang / 'brel med dang / dgag pa dang bsgrub pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas / 
'jug gi don byed mi nus par don mtshungs pa yin te /. This is based on PV I 171c–172: 
sa evārthas tasya vyāvttayo 'pare // tat kāryaṃ* kāraṇaṃ coktaṃ tat svalakṣaṇam 
iṣyate / tattyāgāptiphalāḥ sarvāḥ puruṣāṇāṃ pravttayaḥ //. *I prefer the reading tat 
kāryaṃ to tatkāryaṃ, in accordance with the edition of PVSVṬ 330,4. “This [i.e., the 
particular (viśeṣa)] alone is a real thing, and the others [i.e., the universals] are the 
exclusions with regard to this [i.e., the particular]. This [i.e., the particular] is called 
effect and cause. This is regarded as being the svalakṣaṇa. All the activities of human 
beings are carried out to abandon or obtain this [particular].” Compare the similar 
classification appearing in many dGe lugs pa treatises, as cited in Yoshimizu (1998: 58; 
63 n. 9). 
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efficacy. Vasubandhu also seems to have held the view that the real existence 
of conditioned things is grounded on their causal ability, whereas causal rela-
tions are impossible in the case of unconditioned and permanent things.8 
 It should be noted, incidentally, that the Sautrāntika were not the only ones 
to resort to this view. Indeed, this was also the position of all Buddhists who 
were concerned with disproving the existence of an unconditioned permanent 
agent such as a God (īśvara) or a Self (ātman). Vasubandhu and some early 
Yogācāra masters, for example, attempted to refute the possibility of such a 
permanent existent by discrediting its causal ability, arguing that neither gradu-
ally (krama) nor simultaneously (yaugapadya) is it able to produce an effect.9 
For them, permanent things can by no means function as a cause. Dharmakīrti 
subsequently used this argument both in his refutation of a permanent agent 
and his proof of momentariness. It is moreover on account of its causal efficacy 
that he included the individual (svalakṣaṇa) among real entities, arguing, 
mainly from an epistemological point of view, that an individual can be in-
ferred to exist in the external world as it appears to one’s perception.10 In other 
words, the fact that a thing is individually cognized shows that it is capable of 
producing a cognition of its own image, in contrast to the universal, which is 
not cognized separately from an individual.11 
                     
8 See, e.g., his refutation of the Self (ātman) as a cause of consciousnesses in the Kar-
masiddhi; I have discussed this refutation in Yoshimizu (1999: 235–245). See also 
AKBh 91,4f.: saṃsktasyaiva dharmasya hetuphale bhavataḥ. (II 55d) nāsaṃsktasya 
te. “Cause and effect occur solely to conditioned things, not to unconditioned [things].” 
AKBh 92,4f.: sarvam evāsaṃsktam adravyam iti Sautrāntikāḥ. na hi tad rūpavedanā-
divat bhāvāntaram asti. “The Sautrāntikas say that whatever is unconditioned is not a 
substance, for it is not a distinct entity like visual matter and sensation.”  
9 See Yoshimizu (1999) and the studies cited therein. 
10 PV III 390d–391b (Tosaki 1985: 73f.): hetubhedānumā bhavet // abhāvād akṣabud-
dhīnāṃ satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣu /. “A different cause [of sense cognition from internal 
sense organs, etc.,] is to be inferred, because sense cognitions do not arise even if other 
causes exist.” PV III 391cd, on the other hand, is considered to propose the theory of 
cognition-only (vijñaptimātra): niyamaṃ yadi na brūyāt pratyayāt samanantarāt //. 
“[The inference is established] insofar as the restriction [of the arising of sense cogni-
tion] is not said to rest on an immediate cause.” 
11 PV III 126 (Tosaki 1979: 207f.): ekatra dṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dśyate / na 
tasmād bhinnam asty anyat sāmānyaṃ buddhyabhedataḥ //. “The distinct thing (bheda, 
i.e., svalakṣaṇa) that is seen at one [place] is to be seen nowhere else. Nothing else 
exists as a universal separate from this, because there is no difference between the co-
gnitions [of the svalakṣaṇa and the sāmānya].” In this verse, Dharmakīrti is demonstra-
ting the non-existence of the universal on the grounds that it is not cognized separately 
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 To sum up, what is conditioned is to be identified with the individual be-
cause both refer to a real entity, which is causally efficacious. The imperma-
nent also proves to be real given that permanent things are unreal due to their 
causal inability. But why exactly are the conditioned and the impermanent cau-
sally efficacious? If it were completely self-evident that only conditioned 
things could take part in production as a conditioning factor,12 one might well 
posit a certain essential concomitance between causal efficacy and the proper-
ties of being conditioned, being an individual and being impermanent. In other 
words, these properties could be supposed to lead to the causation of an effect.  
 But since the theory of causality is so much at the core of the Sautrāntika 
philosophy, I believe that it is worth reexamining the questions of how and why 
x) the conditioned, y) the individual and z) the impermanent are causally effi-
cacious. A key to answering these questions is the notion of “spatiotemporal 
restriction” (deśakālaniyama), which figures in the process of causation and is 
paradigmatic of causal efficacy. 
 The present paper is therefore an attempt to resolve the complexity of the 
Sautrāntika philosophical system by shedding light on its notion of causal effi-
cacy and the spatiotemporal restriction (deśakālaniyama) that characterizes 
how causality functions. Although the variety and number of sources to which I 
shall refer is limited, my analysis extends over the entire philosophical tradition 
related to the later Sautrāntika, that is, from Vasubandhu to subsequent Tibetan 
interpreters. In so doing, my special focus will be to clarify the Sautrāntika’s 
attribution of causal efficacy to the conditioned, the individual and the 
impermanent as a way to validate their reality.  
                     
from the individual. If it were a real existent, it would have to exist independently of 
the individual and be cognized separately. Cf. also PVin I 16 (Vetter 1966: 56): gcig tu 
mthong ba'i khyad par ni // gzhan 'ga' zhig tu ma mthong phyir // de las spyi gzhan tha 
dad ni // yod min tha dad blo med phyir //; PV III 50 (Tosaki 1979: 119): jñānamātrār-
thakaraṇe 'py ayogyam ata eva tat / tad ayogyatayārūpaṃ tad dhy avastuṣu lakṣa-
ṇam //. “For this reason (i.e., because the universal does not appear to a cognition), the 
[universal] is unable to accomplish the aim of [producing] a mere cognition. It does not 
have a real form, owing to this inability, for this [inability] is a characteristic of unreal 
entities.” An object’s ability to produce a cognition is regarded as a minimum causal 
efficacy. See PVV 113,16 ad PV III 50 (mentioned in Tosaki 1979: 61 n. 11 and 119 n. 
142): antyā hīyaṃ bhāvānām arthakriyā yad uta svajñānajananam. “Indeed, it is a min-
imum causal efficacy for [real] things to produce a cognition of themselves.” 
12 Dharmakīrti’s explanation of how it is possible for an impermanent thing to gradu-
ally and simultaneously produce an effect appears in his HB. See Yoshimizu (2003b). 
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1. Vasubandhu on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction 
In accordance with the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), 
the Buddhists in general do not accept causeless production. Rather, whatever 
is produced (ktaka) or conditioned (saṃskta) is said to have its own cause, a 
cause that conditions (saṃskāra) its product to arise at a particular place and 
time. A seed, for instance, causes the arising of a sprout with the help of sun-
shine, earth and water. Together they condition where and when the sprout 
arises. Any product that comes into existence thus obtains its own spatiotempo-
ral location. In other words, the conditioning entity produces an effect through 
determining its spatiotemporal location. Vasubandhu calls this causal proce-
dure “spatiotemporal restriction” (deśakālaniyama or deśakālapratiniyama), 
not only in his AKBh, but also in his Viṃśatikā. To my reading, the meaning of 
the term is the same in both works, although they belong to different philoso-
phical positions. Both texts present Vasubandhuʼs view that spatiotemporal 
restriction exemplifies in the causal efficacy of a conditioning entity. Let us 
look at the details of how this notion is presented in the Viṃśatikā and AKBh.  
 The opening discussion of the Viṃśatikā addresses the criticism of the the-
ory of cognition- or mind-only (vijñapti- or cittamātra) expressed by those who 
insist on the real existence of external causes – among the functions of which 
we find spatiotemporal restriction. The entire objection reads as follows: 
(v.2) If a cognition [occurs] without [depending on] an [external] object, then nei-
ther 1) spatiotemporal restriction (deśakālaniyama), nor 2) non-restriction with re-
gard to the mental continuum [of the cognizer] (santānāniyama), nor 3) the produc-
tion of an effect (ktyakriyā), are possible. 
What is hereby asserted is as follows: If the cognition of visual matter (gzugs,*rūpa) 
and so on occurs without an [external] object such as [real] visual matter, then, 
since it is not caused by an external object such as [real] visual matter, 1) why does 
it occur at a particular place and not everywhere? Why does it occur at this place 
alone at a particular time, not always? 2) Why does it occur in the mental continua 
of all those who are staying at this place and time, and not in the [mental contin-
uum] of only one [person], as is the case for the appearance of hair and the like 
which occur only in the mental continua of those who have an eye-disease [but] not 
in that of others? 3) Why is it that the hair, bees and so on that are seen by those 
who have an eye-disease do not produce the effect of hair and so on, whereas other 
things [i.e., the hair and so on that are seen by those who do not have an eye-dis-
ease] do produce it? Why is it that the food, drink, clothes, poison, weapons and so 
on [that are experienced] in a dream do not produce the effect of food and so on, 
whereas other things [i.e., real food, etc.] do produce it? Why is it that the city of 
the Gandharvas, being non-existent, does not produce the effect of a city, whereas 
other things [i.e., real cities] do produce it? Insofar as there is no external object, 
neither 1) spatiotemporal restriction, nor 2) non-restriction with regard to the mental 
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continuum [of the cognizer], nor 3) the production of an effect is therefore possi-
ble.13 
In the above passage from the Viṃśatikā, the opponent argues that the follow-
ing three problems would arise if we supposed that the cognition of an object 
could occur without any real external cause and appeared only as an objective 
part of the cognition (vijñapti): (1) it would be impossible to restrict the cog-
nized object to a particular place and time, (2) it would be impossible to make 
it perceptible to all those who are present there at that time, and (3) the object 
could not produce an effect, since it would be unreal.  
 But in the following lines of the Viṃśatikā, Vasubandhu rules out this objec-
tion by demonstrating that just as they do in a dream, these three functions still 
hold when considered from the point of view of cognition-only.14 Now what is 
                     
13 Viṃśatikā 3,7–16 ad 2: na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca / na ca ktyakriyā 
yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ // (v.2) *kim uktaṃ bhavati. yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rū-
pādivijñaptir utpadyate na rūpādyarthāt, kasmāt kvacid deśa utpadyate na sarvatra, 
tatraiva ca deśe kadācid utpadyate na sarvadā, taddeśakālapratiṣṭhitānāṃ sarveṣāṃ 
saṃtāna utpadyate na kevalam ekasya, yathā taimirikāṇāṃ saṃtāne keśādyābhāso nān-
yeṣāṃ, kasmād yat taimirikaiḥ keśabhramarādi dśyate tena keśādikriyā na kriyate, na 
ca tadanyair na kriyate, yad annapānavastraviṣāyudhādi svapne tenānnādikriyā na kri-
yate, na ca tadanyair na kriyate, gandharvanagareṇāsattvān nagarakriyā na kriyate, na 
ca tadanyair na kriyate, tasmād arthābhāve deśakāla*niyamaḥ saṃtānaniyamaḥ ktya-
kriyā ca na yujyate. I adopt v.2 from the manuscript (Vś A3a5f.). The Chinese reads it 
without the negation of deśakālaniyama (若識無實境則處時決定 74c3), which Lévi's 
reconstruction follows (yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo deśakālayoḥ). *…* I cite the 
Sanskrit text of the Viṃśatikāvtti reconstructed by Lévi. 
Cf. D4057, 4a5–4b3 (tr. Frauwallner 1958: 366f.; Kajiyama 1976: 7ff.): gal te rnam rig 
don min na // yul dang dus nges med cing // sems kyang nges med ma yin la // bya ba 
byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur // (v.2) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na / gal te gzugs la 
sogs pa'i don med par gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ste gzugs la sogs pa'i 
don las ma yin na // ci'i phyir yul la lar 'byung la thams cad na ma yin / yul de nyid na 
yang res 'ga' 'byung la thams cad du ma yin / yul dang dus de na 'khod pa thams cad 
kyi sems la nges pa med pa 'byung la 'ga' tsam la ma yin / ji ltar rab rib can nyid kyi 
sems la skra la sogs pa snang gi / gzhan dag la ni ma yin // ci'i phyir gang rab rib can 
gyis mthong ba'i skra dang / sbrang bu la sogs pas skra la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la / 
de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / rmi lam na mthong ba'i bza' ba dang btung ba 
dang bgo ba dang dug dang mtshon la sogs pas zas dang skom la sogs pa'i bya ba mi 
byed la / de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / dri za'i grong khyer yod pa ma yin pas 
grong khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la / de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / 'di dag don 
med par med du 'dra na yul dang dus nges pa dang / sems nges pa med pa dang / bya 
ba byed pa 'di dag kyang mi rung ngo zhe na /  
14 Viṃśatikā 3,16–4,9 ad 3–4ab (Vś A3a6, VśV B2a1–6): na khalu na yujyate yasmāt 
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especially interesting for us in the Yogācāra reply is that while Vasubandhu re-
jects the necessary existence of external objects and develops instead the tenet 
of cognition-only, he nonetheless retains the functions that the opponent re-
served for external objects and that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti later attribute to 
the real individual existent. Recall Dignāga’s definition of the svalakṣaṇa as 
the object of perception (pratyakṣa) and Dharmakīrti’s definition of an ulti-
mately real existent as being capable of producing an effect. These two defini-
tions correspond respectively to functions 2 and 3 above. And Vasubandhu 
here adds to these the function of spatiotemporal restriction, which means that 
when a cause produces an effect, such as when a seed produces a sprout, the 
cause restricts its effect to a particular place and time. From a Yogācāra 
perspective, Vasubandhu therefore retains the restrictive function which, in the 
absence of a real external cause, the opponent claimed impossible, just as he 
claimed impossible the production itself.15 
                     
deśādiniyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat … pretavat punaḥ / saṃtānāniyamaḥ … sarvaiḥ pū-
yanadyādidarśane // … svapnopaghātavat ktyakriyā … evaṃ tāvad anyānyair dṣṭān-
tair deśakālaniyamādicatuṣṭayaṃ siddhaṃ. “It is not proper [to say that they are] im-
possible, for as in a dream, spatio[temporal] restriction is established. Moreover, a non-
restriction with regard to the mental continuum [of the cognizer is established], as in 
the case of the ghosts all seeing a river of pus and so on. [And] as in a wet dream, the 
production of an effect [is also established]. … In this way, the fourfold [characteris-
tics] are established through the respective examples.” 
15 Interestingly, this argument is later used by Kumārila (6–7c.) in his critique of the 
Yogācāra theory of cognition-only. See the following verses from the Śūnyavāda of the 
ŚV 221–222: tasmād deśādisadbhāvanimittaiḥ pratyayaiḥ pthak / vastvākārāḥ pratī-
yerann udbhavābhibhavātmakāḥ // yugapad grāhakāṇāṃ ca yo yadākāravācinam / śab-
daṃ smarati tenāsāv ākāraḥ sampratīyate //. “Therefore, the images of an entity, ha-
ving the nature of arising and ceasing, can be perceived separately by the cognitions 
occasioned by [the entity] that is actually existent in space and so on. For grasping [co-
gnitions, images arise] simultaneously [not based on an actual existent in space and so 
on]. The person who recalls the word denoting an image cognizes this image.” Cf. Nyā-
yaratnākara 237,3–10: deśakālāpekṣayā vastvākārāṇām* udbhavābhibhavau, vipine hi 
sāyudhaṃ puruṣaṃ paśyato hiṃsrarūpam udbhūtaṃ pratibhāsate, grāmanagareṣu pā-
lakarūpam, tathā dīpaprabhāyāṃ naktan divaṃ rūpasparśayor udbhāvād grahaṇam, 
yugapad grāhakānāṃ tv ekasminn api deśe kāle ca śabdaviśeṣasmaraṇavaśād ākāravi-
śeṣopalabdhir iti. *Emended: ākāraṇaṃ : ākārāṇaṃ C. “The arising and ceasing of the 
images of an entity [occur] depending on place and time. Namely, to the person who 
sees an armed man in a forest the image of someone threatening appears to have arisen, 
while the image of someone who protects [appears to the person who sees an armed 
man] in a village or a city. In the same manner, at night or during the day, [or] in the 
light of a lamp, the grasping [of objects] arises on the basis of visual matter[s] and 
tangible thing[s]. For grasping [cognitions], however, the perception of a particular 
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 Vasubandhu expresses this same idea in the third chapter of his AKBh, but 
from a Sautrāntika point of view: 
                     
image [arises] simultaneously at one given place and time by virtue of the recollection 
of a particular word.” 
ŚV 253–255: deśakālanimittāni vyañjakāny arthavādinaḥ / śaktīnāṃ kāraṇasthānāṃ 
svakāryaniyamaṃ prati // śaktayo 'pi bhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattikalpitāḥ / prasiddhāḥ 
pāramārthikyaḥ pratikāryaṃ vyavasthitāḥ // bhavatas tu na vijñānād bhinnābhinnā 
nirūpyate / śaktiḥ saṃvtisadbhāvam utsjya paramārthataḥ //. “For those who assert 
[the existence of] external objects, the manifestations of abilities consisting in causes 
are based on place and time in order to restrict [their] own effects. The abilities of 
things are conjectured to be ultimately established and fixed for each effect by means 
of an inference from [their] effect. For you, however, having dismissed it [as] existing 
conventionally, the ability is not ascertained to be separate from, or identical with, a 
cognition from the ultimate standpoint.” Cf. Nyāyaratnākara 243,21–31: śaktimad api 
hi tantvādikāraṇaṃ na sarvadā kāryam ārabhate, kin tu śaktyabhivyañjakaṃ sahakāri-
ṇam apekṣate, tac ca deśakālāditantuvāyādinimittam asmatpakṣe vidyate, yadvaśena 
kadācit kāryārambhaniyama iti. … “A cause such as thread does not always produce 
[its] effect, even though it has the ability [to do so]. The manifestation of an ability 
depends on cooperating causes. In our view, this is considered to be based on place, 
time and so on, as well as on thread, a weaver and so on, by virtue of which the 
production of an effect is restricted to a certain time.” 
ŚV 256, 257ab: vāsanaiva ca yuṣmābhiḥ śaktiśabdena gīyate / nimittaniyatatvaṃ ca vā-
sanāyā yad ucyate // tasyāś cāsambhavenaitad apārārthyāc ca durlabham /. “Besides, 
you mean none other than a residue by the word ‘ability’ and [you] state that the resi-
due has the restriction of a cause. This [statement] is untenable, since the [residue] is 
not destined for others because of [its] being incapable.” Cf. Nyāyaratnākara 244,8–11: 
asmākaṃ hy ātmārthā vāsanā, tad asāv ātmapraṇidhānādyapekṣayā vilambata iti yuk-
tam, bhavatas tu yasminn asāv āhitā tasya kṣaṇikatvād ananyāpekṣatvāc ca na kiñcid 
vilambanimittam astīti sarvadaiva tantujñānāt paṭajñānaṃ syād iti. “For us, the residue 
is destined for oneself. Hence, it is proper to say that this [residue] remains depending 
on one’s own use and so on. For you, however, there is no basis for saying where in 
[the cognition, i.e., vijñāna] this [residue] is deposited, since this [cognition] is mo-
mentary and independent of others. Consequently, it follows that the cognition of cloth 
would always occur from the cognition of thread.” 
ŚV 257cd: deśakālanimittādi na ca te 'sti niyāmakam //. “Neither place, nor time, nor 
occasion and so on* exist for you.” *As for the performance of a sacrifice, the Mīmāṃ-
saka counts place, time, occasion, result (phala) and the object of purification (saṃ-
skārya) as restricted factors. See Nyāyaratnākara 244,12ff.: na ca deśakālādikam api 
bhavatām asti, yataḥ kadācid ārambhaḥ kadācid anārambha iti niyamaḥ sidhyed ity 
āha. “For you, place, time and so on, on the basis of which the restriction should take 
place with regard to when [a cognition] occurs and when not, also do not exist. It is 
therefore said, ‘Neither place, nor time, …’.” 
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The efficacy (sāmarthya) of a seed, etc., in [producing] a sprout, etc., as well as 
[that] of fire, etc., in cooking [food], etc., are also seen through spatiotemporal re-
striction (deśakālapratiniyama). Hence, there is no origination without a cause (nir-
hetuka). The assertion that a permanent cause (nityakāraṇa) exists has also already 
been refuted.16 
Now, although this is the only passage of the AKBh where the notion of deśa-
kālaniyama appears, it is extremely important for our investigation because it 
suggests a definite link within the framework of the theory of causality between 
(1) causal efficacy, (2) spatiotemporal restriction and (3) impermanence (anit-
yatva). Indeed, in his use of deśakālapratiniyamāt, which can be analyzed as 
deśakālayoḥ pratiniyamāt,17 it may be supposed that Vasubandhu considers a 
                     
16 AKBh 130,27 ad III (Lokanirdeśa) 19d: dṣṭaṃ ca aṅkurādiṣu bījādīnāṃ 
sāmarthyaṃ deśakālapratiniyamād agnyādīnāṃ ca pākajādiṣv iti nāsti nirhetukaḥ prā-
durbhāvaḥ. nityakāraṇāstitvavādaś ca prāg eva paryudastaḥ. The last part of this verse 
may refer to AKBh 101,6–102,19 ad AK II 64, where a permanent God (īśvara) is 
rejected as the single cause of the world. See the text cited below, as well as Katsura 
(2003: 112 infra). AKV III 284: aṅkuranālakāṇḍapattrādiṣu bījāṅkuranālakāṇḍādīnāṃ 
sāmarthyam utpādanāya. kasmāt. deśākālapratiniyamāt. deśakālayos tu pratiniyamāt. 
tatra deśapratiniyamo bījādisambaddha eva deśa utpatteḥ, kālapratiniyamo bījān-
antaram utpatteḥ. agnyādīnāṃ vā 'gniśītoṣṇābhighātacakṣurādīnāṃ pākajādiṣu pākaja-
sukhaduḥkhaśabdacakṣurvijñānādiṣu dṣṭaṃ sāmarthyaṃ deśakālapratiniyamāt. yadi hi 
nirhetukaḥ prādurbhāvaḥ syāt, bījādīnām aṅkurādīṣu agnyādīnāṃ ca pākajādiṣu deśa-
kālapratiniyamenotpattiṃ prati sāmarthyaṃ na syāt. sarvaṃ sarvatra sarvadotpadyeta. 
na caivaṃ dṣṭam ity ato nāsti nirhetukaḥ prādurbhāvaḥ. nityakāraṇāstitvavādaḥ prāg 
eva paryudastaḥ. neśvarādeḥ kramādibhir iti vacanāt. “With regard to sprout, stalk, 
branch, leaf, etc., seed, sprout, stalk, branch, etc., have a [causal] efficacy for producing 
[them]. Why? Through spatiotemporal restriction, that is, because [a seed, etc.] restrict 
[them] to a [particular] place and time. Of these [two kinds of restrictions], spatial 
restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises at the very place connected 
with a seed, etc. Temporal restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises 
immediately after a seed. Likewise, the [causal] efficacy of fire and suchlike, i.e., of 
fire, cold, heat, striking [a tone], an eye, etc., for cooking and suchlike, i.e., for 
cooking, pleasure, pain, sound, eye-cognition, etc., is seen through spatiotemporal 
restriction. If, however, there were an origination without a cause, the [causal] efficacy 
of a seed, etc., with regard to a sprout, etc., and the [causal efficacy] of fire, etc., with 
regard to cooking, etc., for [their] arising through spatiotemporal restriction would not 
exist. Everything would arise everywhere at every time. Yet such is not seen. Hence, 
there is no origination without a cause. The assertion that a permanent cause exists has 
indeed already been refuted by the statement [in AK II 64d] ‘From Īśvara, etc., [things] 
do not [arise] by succession, etc.’” 
17 See AKV cited above in n. 16. 
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seed to actually produce a sprout through determining its spatiotemporal loca-
tion. Notably, Yaśomitra interprets this passage as follows:  
Spatial restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises at the very place 
connected with a seed (etc.). Temporal restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a 
sprout] arises immediately after a seed.18  
Just as he did in the Viṃśatikā, Vasubandhu moreover rejects, now from a Sau-
trāntika point of view, any production that lacks a real cause, for where there is 
no cause, there can be no spatiotemporal restriction, and without spatiotempo-
ral restriction, as added by Yaśomitra, everything would arise everywhere at 
every time.19 Significant too is the last sentence of the above passage, where 
Vasubandhu rejects the possibility of a permanent cause; it is very likely that 
he is referring, albeit without explicit mention, to AKBh II 64d, in which the 
hypothesis that a permanent God (īśvara) is the unique cause of the world is re-
jected.20 For indeed, although neither Vasubandhu nor the commentator Yaśo-
mitra supplies any further explanation about the earlier refutation referred to 
here, it is obvious that the same absurdity would follow from a permanent 
cause as would from an uncaused production, i.e., everything would arise 
everywhere at every time due to a lack of spatiotemporal restriction, since a 
permanent cause is considered to exist everywhere at all times. In short, what-
ever lacks its own spatiotemporal location cannot determine the spatiotemporal 
location of an effect. 
 Vasubandhu thus provides a clarification that proves useful to our inquiry 
into the relation between the conditioned, the individual, the impermanent and 
the causally efficacious. According to him, (x') the conditioned (saṃskta) is 
causally efficacious for, insofar as it is itself produced by its own cause and 
thus restricted to a particular spatiotemporal location, it can produce an effect 
through restricting that effect to a particular place and time. (z') An imperma-
nent thing, in turn, serves to cause an effect, since insofar as it has its own tem-
poral location, the impermanent thing is capable of restricting its effect to the 
particular moment that comes immediately after it has perished.21 Finally, (y') 
                     
18 See AKV cited above in n. 16. 
19 See AKV cited above in n. 16. 
20 See AKV cited above in n. 16. 
21 One should note that this supposition suggests the preclusion of the possible 
existence of a produced and nevertheless permanent thing. Such an existence was not 
conceivable for early Buddhists. What is produced necessarily has a spatiotemporal 
restriction and therefore cannot be permanent. Dharmakīrti was the first to logically 
exclude the possible production of a permanent thing by introducing a sattvānumāna 
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the individual (svalakṣaṇa), as interpreted by Dharmakīrti, can also be said to 
have causal efficacy, for it is perceived at a particular place and time, contrary 
to the universal, which is considered to pervade many places and times. The 
spatiotemporal individuality of an object thus serves to restrict a cognition to its 
own image at a particular place and time. Consequently, one must say that the 
unconditioned, the permanent and the universal, which all have no spatiotem-
poral restriction of their own, lack also causal efficacy since they are not in a 
position to provide any spatiotemporal restriction to any effect. For the truth of 
the matter is that all things in this world are observed to occupy a particular 
place and time. 
2. Dharmakīrti on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction 
It quickly becomes evident upon reading Dharmakīrti that he shares the same 
view as his predecessor Vasubandhu on the question of causal efficacy. To 
illustrate this, I shall first quote a passage from his PVSV, where Dharmakīrti 
denies the possibility of a causeless production in the same way Vasubandhu 
had done before him. Demonstrating that the perishing (nāśa) of an object has 
no cause, he contrasts this with the production of an effect, which indispens-
ably requires a cause: 
It is also incorrect that objects’ [having] restriction to [their respective] essential na-
ture (svabhāvaniyama) is accidental (ākasmika), since spatiotemporal and substan-
tial restriction (deśakāladravyaniyama) cannot occur to that which does not depend 
[on a cause].22 
To the restrictions of place and time advanced by Vasubandhu, here Dhar-
makīrti adds the restriction of “substance” (dravya), as indicated by the third 
member of the compound deśakāladravyaniyama. According to the commen-
tator Śākyabuddhi (7th–8th cent.), the substance restriction is illustrated by the 
fact that a barley seed restricts its production to a barley sprout and will not 
produce, for example, a rice sprout. To my reading, all of these factors of re-
striction are subsumed under the concept of “essential nature” (svabhāva).  
 In his commentary, Śākyabuddhi further equates the word “accidental” 
(ākasmika) with the word “causeless” (ahetuka),23 thereby precluding the possi-
                     
accompanied by sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa. See, e.g., Steinkellner (1968), Yo-
shimizu (1999 and 2003b). 
22 PVSV 99,12ff. ad 195: na ca svabhāvaniyamo 'rthānām ākasmiko yuktaḥ. anapekṣa-
sya deśakāladravyaniyamāyogāt. 
23 PVṬ D224b7–225a2: don rnams la ni zhes bya ba ni dngos po rnams la'o // blo bur 
du zhes bya ba ni rgyu med par ro // ci'i phyir rigs pa ma yin zhe na / bltos pa med pa 
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bility of a causeless production. Dharmakīrti also expresses this view in the last 
section of PV I, where he writes: 
Fire arises if fuel exists and it does not arise if fuel does not exist. Hence, it is not 
the case that fire has no fuel even if fuel is not seen, because [without fuel], its spa-
tiotemporal restriction (deśakālaniyama) is impossible; if there were a [spatiotem-
poral] restriction [of fire without fuel], that [spatiotemporal] restriction itself would 
be fuel, since fuel is characterized as the material cause of fire. Likewise, the order 
                     
ni zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / rgyu la bltos pa med pa ni yul 'ga' zhig kho na la yin 
gyi thams cad la ma yin zhing / dus 'ga' zhig tu yin gyi thams cad kyi tshe ma yin la / 
nas kyi sa bon la sogs pa rdzas 'ga' zhig la yin gyi thams cad la ma yin pa de lta bu / 
gang 'di yul dang dus dang rdzas nges pa de la mi rung ba'i phyir ro // nges pa yang 
de'i phyir yul la sogs pa la bltos nas yod pa ni rgyu dang ldan pa zhes bya bar rtogs 
so //; Sakai (2003: 7*,9–14), where Sakai’s reconstruction is in square brackets, and 
Inami et. al (1992: 41): arthānāṃ padārthānāṃ svabhāvaniyama iti pravibhaktasva-
bhāvatvam. ākasmika ity ahetukaḥ. kasmān na yukta ity āha – anapekṣasyetyādi. hetu-
nirapekṣasya kvacid eva deśe na sarvatra kvacit kāle na sarvadā kvacid dravye yavabī-
jādau na sarvatreti yo 'yaṃ <deśakāladravyaniyamas tasyāyogāt. niyamo 'pi tasm>ād 
deśādikam apekṣya bhavan hetumān iti gamyate. “The ‘restriction of objects, i.e., 
entities, to [their] essential nature’ means that their essential nature is distinguished. 
‘Accidental’ means causeless. Why is this incorrect? [The reason] is explained by 
‘independent’ and so on. ‘Since spatiotemporal and substantial restriction’ means that 
[a thing] occurs at a particular place, not everywhere, at a particular time, not at every 
time, and in a certain substance like a barley seed, not in every [substance], [all that] is 
impossible with regard to that which is independent of cause. Therefore, it is known 
that the restriction also has a cause insofar as it occurs depending on place and so on.” 
Cf. also PVṬ D225b7f.: yod pa nyid la yang bltos par mi rigs te / rtag pa dag ni gzhan 
gyis yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa nyid kyi phyir ro // de ni yod pa ma yin te / byas pa 
ma yin pa la yod pa nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // yod pa nyid thams cad ni yul dang dus 
ngos po la nges pa yin na rgyu med pa can nyid ni de la nges par mi rung ba'i phyir 
ro //; Sakai (2003: 9*,10–13) and Inami et. al (1992: 42): <sattvam apy apekṣā na 
yujyate, nityānāṃ pareṇa sat>tvenābhyupagatatvāt. naitad asti, aktakasya sattvāyogāt. 
sarvaṃ hi sattvaṃ deśakālavastupratiniyatam, ahetutve tanniyamāyogāt. “It is not 
proper [to assert the impermanence of things] by resorting to the very nature of being 
existent, for the opponent admits that permanent things are existent. This is [however] 
not the case, because that which is not produced cannot have the nature of being 
existent, for every existent is determined in space, time and entity, whereas this 
restriction is impossible with regard to a causeless thing.”; HBṬ 77,1ff.: aktakalakṣa-
ṇaṃ tu sattvaṃ na sambhavaty eva, niyāmakaṃ hetum antareṇa deśakālasvabhāvani-
yamāyogāt. “However, an existence that has the characteristic of being unproduced 
never occurs, because a restriction of space, time and nature is impossible without a 
determining cause.” 
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of letters (varṇānukrama) should manifest by itself without any basis if it did not 
depend on a person’s conception.24 
This passage of PVSV is representative of the way in which Dharmakīrti re-
peatedly demonstrates the impossibility of causeless production by pointing to 
the lack of spatiotemporal restriction. In this last section of PV I, his central 
aim, it is true, is to disprove the Mīmāṃsaka’s affirmation of pervasive, perma-
nent and unproduced (i.e., non-artificial [apauruṣeya]) Vedic words consisting 
of letters (varṇa), sounds (dhvani), words (śabda), sentences (vākya), mantras 
and so on. In the end, however, Dharmakīrti seeks to establish the imperma-
nence of all things, including Vedic scriptures.25 And to do so, he negates the 
possibility of a permanent cause (nityakāraṇa) on account of its lack of 
spatiotemporal restriction, much in the way of Vasubandhu.  
 Still on the question of the order of letters, Dharmakīrti makes elsewhere 
(PV I 260ab) the following comment: 
There is no [such thing as an] order [of letters depending on] place and time (deśa-
kālakrama), since [the opponent] asserts [letters] to be pervasive and permanent 
(vyāptinityatva). 
Either the order of letters is made in terms of place, like [the order] in a row of ants, 
or it is made in terms of time, like [the order] between seeds and sprouts, etc. [But] 
these two kinds [of order] do not occur among [pervasive and permanent] letters.26 
Here, although the word “restriction” (niyama) does not occur, the passage 
strongly suggests that letters compose a word only if they are arranged in a cer-
tain order, which in spelling consists in being restricted to a specific place, 
while in speech it consists in being pronounced at a specific time. But if letters 
were pervasive and permanent, they would occur everywhere at every time, 
and thus it would be impossible for them to adopt the proper order required to 
make a word. This argument of course anticipates the two directions of the 
conclusion, namely that (1) a pervasive and permanent thing is causally 
inefficacious, and (2) the Vedic words are impermanent because they indeed 
consist of letters arranged in the proper order.  
                     
24 PVSV 161,23–162,2 ad 307: satīndhane dāhavtter asaty abhāvād adṣṭendhano 'pi 
dahano nānindhanas tasya deśakālaniyamāyogāt. niyame ca tasyaivendhanatvād daha-
nopādānalakṣaṇatvād indhanasya. tathāyam api varṇānukramaḥ puruṣavikalpaṃ yadi 
nāpekṣeta nirālambanaḥ svayaṃ prakāśeta. 
25 See Yoshimizu (1999: 246 infra). 
26 PV I 260ab and PVSV 135,21ff.: deśakālakramābhāvo vyāptinityatvavarṇanāt / sā 
ceyam ānupūrvī vārṇānāṃ deśaktā vā syāt. yathā pipīlikānāṃ paṅktau. kālaktā vā 
yathā bījāṅkurādīnām. sā dvividhāpi varṇeṣu na saṃbhavati. 
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 If one connects the above two conclusions with Dharmakīrti’s definition of 
the real as being causally efficacious, one can easily establish the theory of im-
permanence or momentariness, according to which all existents are exclusively 
impermanent since a permanent thing, which lacks causal efficacy, does not ex-
ist in reality. This argument, though more refined, is similar to the one ad-
vanced by Vasubandhu to disprove the possibility of a permanent agent, al-
though Dharmakīrti, in his proof of momentariness, in the end resorts to a 
refutation of gradual and simultaneous (kramayaugapadya) production.27 
3. Later interpreters on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction 
It is interesting to find that both Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple, Ratnakīrti, who 
were active from the tenth to the eleventh centuries, also invoke the lack of 
spatiotemporal restriction to criticize the theistic position that a permanent God 
(īśvara) is the unique cause of the world. Their argument, it is true, takes on a 
new character in that it consists in a logical refutation of the pervasion (vyāpti) 
of the property of being an effect (kāryatva) by the property of depending on a 
God who both exerts Himself and is intelligent. Yet, both authors clearly share 
Vasubandhu’s position according to which (a) causal efficacy is exemplified by 
spatiotemporal restriction and (b) a permanent cause is unable to impose that 
restriction. The following discussion from Jñānaśrīmitra’s ĪV, for instance, pre-
supposes these ideas. Spatiotemporal restriction is presented here as a property 
pervading that of being an effect, so that whatever is an effect has spatiotempo-
ral restriction: 
[Objection:] A cause necessarily, and in every case, consists in a complex (kalāpa), 
and this [complex] is not in a confused state. [Now] if that which is united were to 
exist without a being who exerted himself (prayatnavat), it would be so perma-
nently. The same can also be said about place. Accordingly, the same [absurd] con-
sequence (prasaṅga) would follow that there would be no spatiotemporal restriction 
(deśakālāniyama). [Properties] such as being an effect cannot occur unless there is 
dependence on a consciousness (caitanya), i.e., [they cannot occur] when the [prop-
erty] pervading (vyāpaka) [that of] being an effect of a causal complex (kalāpakār-
yatva) is absent; [these properties] are pervaded by [the property of] being depend-
ent on a being who exerts himself. 
[Reply:] If this being who exerts himself, too, were actually momentary and local-
ized, every complex [capable of producing] an effect would [occupy] the very same 
moment and place [as he does]. Hence, a permanent being (sanātana) alone is to be 
acknowledged as pervading (vyāpin). Accordingly, the same [absurd consequence] 
                     
27 See, e.g., Yoshimizu (1999). 
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that there is no spatiotemporal restriction (deśakālāniyama) now still holds. What 
[can be gained] from assuming this [being who exerts himself]?28 
At the end, Jñānaśrīmitra points out the inability of a permanent cause to re-
strict the arising of an effect to a particular place and time. 
 In his ĪSD, Ratnakīrti in turn adds a third factor of restriction (niyama) to 
place and time (deśakāla), namely, “essential nature” (svabhāva). Moreover, he 
identifies three properties as pervading that of being an effect: (1) having a re-
striction to a particular place, time and essential nature (deśakālasvabhāvani-
yama), (2) having causes that are brought together on specific occasions (kādā-
citkakāraṇasannidhi) and (3) arising from a causal complex (sāmagrī). His 
opponent, however, asserts that the existence of an intelligent cause further per-
vades these properties: 
[Opponent:] How then can this unconscious being (acetana) properly bring [the 
causes] together? For us, indeed, [things] that are found in specific places such as a 
stick, etc., without the effort of a potter, are brought together only by virtue of a 
type of invisible entity. Alternatively, things occur as brought together in order to 
[produce] an effect. Therefore, it is established that there is a pervasion (vyāpti) by 
an intelligent being (buddhimat) of [the three properties, viz.,] spatiotemporal and 
essential restrictions (deśakālasvabhāvaniyama), causes being brought together on 
                     
28 ĪV 279,16–22: nanu kāraṇaṃ nāma sarvatra kalāpa eva, sa ca na vyagrāvasthāyām. 
tatsaṃhitaś ca prayatnavantam antareṇa yadi syāt, nityam eva syāt. evaṃ deśe 'pi vāc-
yam. tataś ca sa eva deśakālāniyamaprasaṅga** iti, caitanyanirapekṣatvena kalāpa-
kāryatvasya vyāpakasyābhāvena kāryatvādayo 'sambhavantaḥ prayatnavadapekṣatvena 
vyāpyanta iti cet. evaṃ tarhi so 'pi prayatnavān yadi kṣaṇikaḥ prādeśikaś ca tatkṣaṇai-
kadeśatvam eva sarvakāryagrāmasya syād iti sanātana evāṅgīkartavyo vyāpī ca. tataś 
ca sa eva deśakālāniyamo adyāpi prasakta iti kim asyopagamena. ** Emended in 
accordance with 279,12 and 21 : deśakālaniyamaprasaṅga. Cf. also ĪV 279,10–15 ad 
PV II 10*: na hi prayatnopayogam antareṇāpi kāryajanmani sambhāvyamāne bādha-
kaṃ kiñcid ālocayāmaḥ. tat kutas tatra niyamaḥ kāryādeḥ. atha kāladeśādyaniyama-
prasaṅgo bādhakaḥ. tad ayuktam, [yataḥ] pratiniyataśakter asarvakālabhāvinaḥ sva-
kāraṇāyattasannidheḥ kāraṇadaśāviśeṣasya vyatireke 'pi vyatirekaḥ kāryasya sambha-
van na prayatnavannāntarīyakatvam upakalpayituṃ kalpate. sarvathā hetvanapekṣā-
yāṃ tadbādhakam upapadyamānaṃ kāryasya hetumātreṇa vyāptiṃ sādhayet. na tu 
hetuviśeṣeṇa prayatnavatā. 
*PV II 10: sthitvāpravttisaṃsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu / iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṣṭān-
te saṃśayo 'thavā //. “With regard to [the logical reasons set forth by the opponents], 
such as an activity after a rest, having a particular configuration, and the accomplish-
ment of a purpose, [the logical fault is obtained that they are] proving what is already 
established [by us], or [that the probandum] is not established in the example, or [that] 
doubt [remains about the logical reasons].” For an interpretation of this verse, see, e.g., 
Kanō (1991: 119ff.), Krasser (1999: 216ff.), and Krasser (2002: 33–40). 
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specific occasions (kādācitkakāraṇasannidhi), and there being causal complexes 
(sāmagrī). If these pervading [properties] are lacking when an intelligent being is 
absent, [the property of] being an effect [would also] be lacking. [Hence the prop-
erty of being an effect] is pervaded by there being an anterior intelligent being 
(buddhimatpūrvakatva). That is to say, three [kinds of] non-cognition of a pervading 
[property] are set forth in order to establish the relation [between the pervading 
properties and those to be pervaded]. 
Likewise, it is not possible to suppose that one could dispense with an intelligent 
being and thus that an effect could have no cause (ahetuka) at all, for then it [would] 
follow that there would be no spatiotemporal and essential restrictions (deśakāla-
svabhāvaniyamābhāva), [i.e., there would be no effect]. Nor should it be suspected 
that [an effect] might occur solely from something other than an intelligent being, 
for it [would] follow [absurdly] that there would be no simultaneous arising [of 
various effects] either. And nor can it be the case that [an effect] occurs from an-
other thing as well as from this [intelligent being], since it [would] follow that there 
would be no cause if the cause were not restricted, [i.e., determined].29  
Here, in order to demonstrate his general principle that every effect is caused 
by a conscious being,30 i.e., that the property of having a conscious being as a 
cause pervades that of being an effect, the opponent appeals to the non-cogni-
tion of pervading properties of being an effect (vyāpakānupalabdhi), thus rely-
ing upon a valid cognition which refutes that the logical reason inheres in a lo-
cus that lacks the property to be proven (viz., sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramā-
ṇa).31 His point is that the opposite of the property to be proven (sādhyavipar-
                     
29 ĪSD 40,32–41,8: nanv ayam acetanaḥ kathaṃ yathāvat sannidhāpayet. no khalu kva-
cidavasthāni daṇḍādīni vinā kumbhakāraprayatnam adṣṭaviśeṣavaśād eva parasparaṃ 
sannidhīyante. sannihitāni vā kāryāya prabhavantīti buddhimatā deśakālasvabhāvani-
yamasya kādācitkakāraṇasannidheḥ sāmagryāś ca vyāptisiddhiḥ. buddhimadabhāve 
caiṣāṃ vyāpakānāṃ nivttau nivartamānaṃ kāryatvaṃ buddhimatpūrvakatvena 
vyāpyata iti pratibandhasiddhaye vyāpakānupalambhatrayam upanyastam. tathā ca na 
kāryaṃ buddhimatparityāgāt ahetukam eva bhavatīti sambhāvyam, deśakālasvabhāva-
niyamābhāvaprasaṅgāt. nāpi buddhimato 'nyasmād eva bhavatīti śaṅkanīyam, sakd 
apy utpādābhāvaprasaṅgāt. na cānyasmād asmād api bhavatīti sambhāvyam, aniyata-
hetutve 'hetutvaprasaṅgāt. 
30 See the logical proof found in ĪSD 32,16–20: vivādādhyāsitaṃ buddhimaddhetukam, 
kāryatvāt. yat kāryaṃ tad buddhimaddhetukam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. kāryaṃ cedam. tasmād 
buddhimaddhetukam iti. “That which is under discussion has an intelligent being as 
[its] cause, because it is an effect. Whatever is an effect has an intelligent being as [its] 
cause, like a pot. That [which is under discussion] is also an effect. Therefore, it has an 
intelligent being as [its] cause.” On the various Naiyāyika logical proofs of the exis-
tence of God, see Kanō (1991). 
31 Cf. ĪSD 40,25–30: nanu bādhakapramāṇābhāvo 'siddhaḥ. tathā hīdaṃ kāryatvaṃ 
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yaya), i.e., an unconscious cause, produces no effects, for it cannot make any-
thing acquire the three properties that pervade every effect, i.e., spatiotemporal 
and essential restrictions, etc. Given this incapacity of unconscious causes, then 
on account of the non-cognition of the three pervading properties, it is ascer-
tained that the property constituting the logical reason, i.e., being an effect, 
does not occur without a conscious cause. Moreover, the opponent also pre-
cludes the possibility of the causeless origination of an effect, invoking the 
same absurdity that there would again be no spatiotemporal or essential restric-
tions.  
 In his rejoinder, Ratnakīrti in turn focuses on rejecting the opponent’s claim 
that the three properties of an effect presuppose a conscious cause like an intel-
ligent being. Although he does not ascribe the inability to produce restrictions 
to the permanence of the intelligent being, nonetheless for him, too, it is true 
that the property of being an effect is pervaded by these three properties.32  
 In this manner, Dharmakīrti’s successors also retain the traditional theory of 
causality according to which the production of an effect takes place through 
spatiotemporal restriction. 
                     
yathā buddhimatā vyāptam iṣyate tathā deśakālasvabhāvaniyatatvenāpi, kādācitkakā-
raṇasannidhimattayāpi, sāmagrīkāryatvenāpi vyāptam upalabdham. sa ca deśakālādi-
niyamaḥ kādācitkakāraṇasannidhiḥ sāmagrī vā buddhimatpūrvakā siddhā. yadi punar 
acetanāni cetanānadhiṣṭhitāni kāryaṃ kuryuḥ tato yatra kvacanāvasthitāni janayeyur iti 
na deśakālasvabhāvaniyataprasavaṃ kāryam upalabhyeta. 
32 Cf. ĪSD 41,12–17: sidhyaty evedaṃ manorājyaṃ yadi deśakālasvabhāvaniyamasya 
kādācitkakāraṇasannidheḥ sāmagryāś ca buddhimatpūrvakatvena vyāptiḥ sidhyati. 
kevalam etad eva durāpam. buddhimadabhāve 'pi hi svahetubalasamutpannasanni-
dhe[ḥ] pratiniyatadeśakālaśaktinā 'cetanenāpi sāmagrīlakṣaṇakāraṇaviśeṣeṇa kriya-
māṇāni deśakālasvabhāvaniyamakadācitkakāraṇasannidhisāmagrīkāryatvāni yujyanta 
iti sandigdhāsiddhā vyāpakānupalabdhayaḥ. 41,18–26: buddhimadabhāve samavadhā-
nam eva kuta iti cet. tad api cetanānadhiṣṭhitayathoktācetanasāmagrīviśeṣād eva. so 'pi 
tādśād ity anādyacetanasāmagrīparamparāto 'pi deśādiniyamasambhāvanāyāṃ nā-
vaśyaṃ buddhimadapekṣā. ghaṭāder deśakālasvabhāvaniyamaḥ kādācitkakāraṇasan-
nidhiś ca, sāmagrī ca buddhimatpūrvakā dṣṭā ity aparo ’pi deśakālasvabhāvaniyamā-
dis tathaiveti cet. yady evaṃ ghaṭādikam api kāryaṃ bahuśo buddhimatpūrvakam upa-
labdham iti sarvam eva kāryaṃ tathāstu, kim anena vyāpakānu[pa]lambhopa-
nyāsadurvyasanena. ghaṭāder bahuśo buddhimatpūrvakatvadarśane 'pi na sarvatra 
kāryamātrasya tathābhāvaniścayaś cet. deśādiniyamādīnām apīdaṃ samanām iti 
katham atrāpi śaṅkāvyudāsaḥ.  
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4. The individual (svalakṣaṇa) as being spatiotemporally restricted (deśa-
kālaniyata) 
Apart from the discussion of causation and causal efficacy, the concept of spa-
tiotemporal restriction came to be assigned another function in the later tradi-
tion: the concept would later serve to define what constituted individuals (sva-
lakṣaṇa). Indeed, while Ratnakīrti, for instance, spoke of such restrictions in 
the context of his critique of permanent causes, Mokṣākaragupta (12th cent.)33 
defined svalakṣaṇa as that which was restricted to a particular place, time and 
form. He wrote in his Tarkabhāṣā: 
The [perception] has the individual (svalakṣaṇa) as its object. The four types of per-
ception (viz., indriya-, manas-, svasaṃvedana- and yogiprayakṣa) are to be under-
stood as having individuals as their objects. The individual is the real entity’s own 
nature [or the real entity itself] (vastusvarūpa) that is unique (asādhāraṇa) and re-
stricted to a [particular] place, time and form [or appearance] (deśakālākāraniya-
ta).34 
In addition to defining svalakṣaṇa in terms of spatiotemporal restriction, 
Mokṣākaragupta also introduced a third member to the compound deśakālā-
kāraniyata, namely, ākāra, a term that refers to a defining feature which distin-
guishes one thing from all other things. This was typical of later Indian writers, 
who used a variety of terms to express the addition of a third (and fourth, etc.) 
restriction to those of place and time in their description of svalakṣaṇa.35  
 Much later in Tibet, Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429–1489), a great fig-
ure of the Sa skya pa sect, reiterated the same definition while commenting on 
PV III 2a. He wrote in his bDe bdun rab gsal: 
By the statement “because of being similar and dissimilar” (sadśāsadśa) [found in 
PV III 2a,36 Dharmakīrti] teaches the specific meaning-exclusion (i.e., meaning it-
                     
33 About his dates, see Kajiyama (1966: 6–11). 
34 TBh 21,8ff. (tr. Kajiyama 1966: 56): tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam / tasya caturvidha-
sya pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ viṣayo boddhavyaḥ / svalakṣaṇam ity asādhāraṇaṃ 
vastusvarūpaṃ deśakālākāraniyatam /. Cf. also TBh 13,15, where, in the same man-
ner, deśakālākāraniyata is identified with vastusvarūpa. 
35 Within the framework of the theory of causality, words such as svabhāva, dravya or 
vastu, which all refer to the substantial existence of a produced effect, appear as the 
third member of the compound deśakāla°, whereas in later discussions of the svalakṣa-
ṇa, words expressing the uniqueness of its various attributes are preferred (e.g., ākāra, 
vyakti, pratibhāsa, śakti). 
36 PV III 1–2 (Tosaki 1979: 58f.): mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viṣayadvaividhyāc chaktyaśakti-
taḥ / arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ // sadśāsadśatvāc ca viṣayā-
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self) of the individual (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (spyi, sāmānya), 
respectively. Hence, the definitions of these two are respectively [given as follows]: 
A “thing that does not share place, time and essential nature [with other things” is 
the definition of an individual (rang mtshan)] (yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres pa). A 
“superimposed [thing] that appears to share place, time and essential nature [with 
other things” is the definition of a universal].37 
Go ram pa’s definition of rang mtshan (Skt. svalakṣaṇa) also seems to have 
been accepted by earlier Tibetans. In fact, the expression yul dus rang bzhin ma 
'dres pa is so well established among Tibetan scholars that one can hardly find 
a different formulation in their definitions of rang mtshan, despite the fact that 
there is no equivalent among Indian authors for the words ma 'dres pa, which 
mean “do not share” or “do not mix up.” Tracing the original source of this 
new formulation is a difficult task. PV III 2 aside, Dharmakīrti himself, it is 
true, often uses the expression “not mixed up” (miś or saṃ-sj for “mixed up”) 
to describe the essential uniqueness of the individual, but never in the sense of 
sharing or not sharing place and time. Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan 
(1182–1251), in his auto-commentary to the Rigs gter, also speaks of the nature 
of individuals as being substances that do not mutually mix (rdzas phan tshun 
ma 'dres pa), but he does not also mention spatiotemporal location.38 
 Although it is very unlikely that Mokṣākaragupta invented the definition of 
the svalakṣaṇa as deśakālākāraniyata, clear earlier sources have so far been 
untraceable. There is only one passage in the apoha section of PV I in which 
Dharmakīrti suggests that the svalakṣaṇa is restricted to a particular place, time 
and appearance: 
                     
viṣayatvataḥ / śabdasyānyanimittānāṃ bhāve dhīsadasattvataḥ //. “There are two kinds 
of cognition, since objects are [divided into] two kinds according to whether they are 
capable or incapable of producing an effect. Hairs [appearing in a diseased eye-cog-
nition] and the like are not objects [of cognition], since one fallaciously trusts them to 
be [real] objects. [The object is further divided into two kinds] according to whether it 
is similar or dissimilar [to others], whether it is the object of words or not, or whether 
its knowledge arises when there exist other causes and does not arise [unless there exist 
other causes, or its knowledge exists independently from other causes].” 
37 sDe bdun rab gsal 18a2: 'dra dang mi 'dra nyid phyir dang // (PV III 2a) zhes pas 
rang spyi gnyis kyi thun mong ma yin pa'i don ldog ston pas de gnyis kyi mtshan nyid 
rim bzhin / yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres par gnas pa'i dngos po dang / yul dus rang 
bzhin thun mong par snang ba'i sgro btags so // 
38 Rigs gter rang 'grel ad Rigs gter III 1: rang gi mtshan nyid dang / gsal ba dang / 
dngos po dang / rdzas dang / log pa dang / don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don 
byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun ma 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bur grub pa / 
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It is also incorrect [to say] that the word that was earlier connected [with an indi-
vidual (svalakṣaṇa)] can be applied later, because this [individual] does not pervade 
different places, times and individual appearances (deśakālavyaktibhedānāskan-
dana). Therefore, there is no verbal agreement with regard to the individual.39 
Here the word vyakti (individual appearance) is used as the third member of the 
compound deśakāla°. The word āskandana, which is a derivative of the verb ā-
skand, meaning “to invade” or “attack,” is to be interpreted as indicating a 
pervasion. So while Dharmakīrti is not directly defining the svalakṣaṇa as a 
thing which is restricted to a particular place and time, he is however claiming 
in this passage that the svalakṣaṇa, which is defined as the object of direct per-
ception (pratyakṣa), cannot be the object of words, since a word refers to vari-
ous things at the same time. In his HB, he similarly ascribes to the object of di-
rect perception the property of being restricted to a particular place, time, es-
sential nature and state (deśakālasvabhāvāvasthāniyata), although he does not 
explicitly use the word svalakṣaṇa.40 Finally, the phrase deśakālasvabhāvavi-
prakṣṭa, which could be translated as “being distant or inaccessible with re-
gard to place, time and essential nature,” is often used in PV I and NB II, albeit 
to refer to imperceptible entities.41 
                     
39 PVSV 45,26–29 ad PV I 92: na ca prākktasambandhasyaikatra svalakṣaṇe 
śabdasya paścād prayogo yuktaḥ. tasya deśakālavyaktibhedānāskandanāt. tasmān na 
svalakṣaṇe samayaḥ. 
40 HB 26*,12ff. (tr. Steinkellner 1967: 66f.): taṃ ca deśakālasvabhāvāvasthāniyataṃ 
tadātmanopalabhamānā buddhis tathātvapracyutim asya vyavacchinatti. (yul dang dus 
dang ngo bo nyid dang gnas skabs su nges pa de blos de'i bdag nyid du dmigs pa na di'i 
de kho na nyid med pa rnam par gcod do //) “Moreover, perceiving the [object] which 
is determined on a [particular] place, time, nature and state as having such a nature, the 
cognition excludes this [object’s] losing [that] nature.” 
41 PVSV 165,13–16 ad PV I 312–313: atha kutaścid atiśayād buddhīndriyādīnāṃ sa 
eva vetti nāparaḥ. tasya kuto 'yam atīndriyajñānātiśayaḥ. tathānyo 'pi dṣṭā deśakāla-
svabhāvaviprakṣṭānām arthānāṃ kim asambhavī dṣṭaḥ. “If [you say] for some reason 
that he (i.e., a Jaimini of the Mīmāṃsā school) alone, and nobody else, knows [the true 
meaning of the Veda] because of the superiority of [his] cognition, sense organs and so 
on, [then we ask] why does he have the superior ability to know the transcendental 
[meaning of the Veda]? Likewise, why do [you] consider that there can be no other 
person capable of seeing those objects that are remote (i.e., inaccessible) in terms of 
place, time and nature?” Cf. NB II 27: anyathā cānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpteṣu deśakā-
lasvabhāvaviprakṣṭeṣv artheṣv ātmapratyakṣanivtter abhāvaniścayābhāvāt //. “For 
otherwise, in the case of things that are remote (i.e. inaccessible) in terms of space, 
time and nature, there [can be] no certainty about [their] absence when the characteris-
tic of non-cognition applies, since the perception of [the things] themselves has 
ceased.” Cf. further PVin II 16*,12f.: yul dang dus dang rang bzhin gyis bskal bas na 
 
Chizuko Yoshimizu 1070 
 Other possible sources of inspiration for the later definition of svalakṣaṇa 
may also be found in Śāntarakṣita’s (8th cent.) Tattvasaṃgraha and Kamala-
śīla’s (8th cent.) commentary thereon, where both authors explain the unique-
ness of individual things on the basis of their having different locations and 
features: 
(TS 872) These essentially individual things (vyaktyātman) do not distribute [over 
each other] because of [their] mutually different forms due to differences of place, 
time, activity, ability, appearance, and so on (deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhe-
da).42 
(TSP ad TS 42) In the same manner that iron bars are not mutually connected, these 
individuals (vyakti), like sound, do not distribute [over each other] since, being es-
tablished in their own respective essential nature (svasvabhāvavyavasthita), they are 
different [from each other] with regard to place, time, ability, appearance and so on 
(deśakālaśaktipratibhāsādi).43 
Here the list of characteristics that can be used to differentiate individuals from 
one another amounts to more than five, although these are all finally subsumed 
under each individual’s essential nature (svabhāva). The concept of being 
established in one’s own essential nature (svasvabhāvavyavasthita) can further 
be traced back to Dharmakīrti’s PV I 40, which says: 
Since all things by nature consist in their respective essential nature (svasvabhāva-
vyavasthita), they are distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous 
[things].44 
                     
bskal ba ni rnam pa gsum ste / de dag la ni mi dmigs pa'i go bar byed pa ma yin no // 
42 TS 872 (Śabdārthaparīkṣā): vyaktyātmāno 'nuyanty ete na paraspararūpataḥ / deśa-
kālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ // 
43 TSP 48,14f. ad TS 42 (Praktiparīkṣā): yathā hy ayomayaḥ śalākāḥ parasparam 
asaṅgatās tadvad imāḥ śabdādivyaktayaḥ svasvabhāvavyavasthitatayā deśakālaśakti-
pratibhāsādibhedān na parasparam anvāviśanti. Cf. TS 42: ayaḥśalākākalpā hi krama-
saṅgamūrttayaḥ / dśyante vyaktayaḥ sarvā kalpanāmiśritātmikā //. “Like iron bars, all 
individuals are known to have a form connected with [temporal] phases and to have an 
essence intermingled with conception.”; and TSP 48,18ff.: kathaṃ tarhi sat sad ityādi 
naikena rūpeṇa tathā ‘sa evāyam' iti ca sthireṇa svabhavenānugatā vyavasīyante bhā-
vāḥ, ity āha, kalpanāmiśritātmikā iti. “How then, on account of a single feature like 
‘being existent,’ are things determined to follow an unchangeable nature in the way 
[advanced by the Sāṃkhya when they] say, ‘this is nothing but that’? [Answering this 
question] it is said: ‘having an essence intermingled with conception’.” 
44 PV I 40: sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvā-
bhyāṃ yasmād vyāvttibhāginaḥ // 
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It is interesting to note that such dGe lugs pa scholars as rGyal tshab Dar ma rin 
chen (1364–1432) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po (1385–1438) in-
cluded both the ideas of “not sharing characteristics” and “being established in 
one’s own essential nature” in their own definitions of the svalakṣaṇa, or rang 
mtshan, thus distinguishing themselves from their contemporary Sa skya pa 
colleague, Go ram pa.45 According to mKhas grub, for example, rang mtshan is 
defined as follows: 
In the [Sautrāntika’s] own system, the definition of rang mtshan is the thing (dngos 
po) which consists, without being conceptually imposed, but rather from its own 
side (rang ngos nas) [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (rang bzhin du gnas 
pa, *svabhāvasthita) uncommon [to other things] (thun mong ma yin pa, *asādhāra-
ṇa).46 
For mKhas grub and the dGe lugs pas in general, the fact of not sharing place, 
time and essential nature (yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres pa) was therefore con-
sidered insufficient to define the svalakṣaṇa, for it did not point to its specific 
reality. Consequently, mKhas grub added the fact of “without being con-
ceptually imposed, but rather from its own side” to the description, in order to 
indicate that rather than being virtual, the individual existence of the sva-
lakṣaṇa is intrinsically established.47  
 But while most dGe lugs pas did not focus on the restriction of place, time 
and essential nature in their definition of rang mtshan, they did devote several 
pages to explain this notion. mKhas grub, for example, elucidates the restric-
tion to a particular place, time and nature as follows: 
A pillar which [exists] in the morning does not exist in the afternoon. This is the 
meaning of “not sharing time” (dus ma 'dres pa). […] A substance which touches 
[the earth to the] east does not touch [the earth to the] west. Such is the meaning of 
“not sharing place” (yul ma ’dres pa). […] The nature which exists in a spotted cow 
                     
45 The sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel, ascribed to Tsong kha pa, 
gives, for instance, the same definition of the svalakṣaṇa as Go ram pa (3b6, see 
Yoshimizu 2000: 24). But this may be one of those cases where the tradition that was 
handed down ascribed an idea to Tsong kha pa that he did not truly hold, for this 
treatise is a collection of terms supposed to have been compiled for educational pur-
poses. Dreyfus (1997: 116–117) has discussed the dGe lugs pa’s and Sa skya pa’s 
respective definitions of the svalakṣaṇa. Cf. also Yoshimizu 2004. 
46 Yid kyi mun sel 21b2f.: rang lugs la / rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa 
min par rang ngos nas thun mong ma yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnas pa'i dngos po'o //. 
Other dGe lugs pas give a similar definition. Cf. Yoshimizu 2004: n. 9.  
47 For the details of the dGe lugs pa definition of rang mtshan, see Yoshimizu 2004. 
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does not exist in a brown cow. Such is the meaning of “not sharing nature” (rang 
bzhin ma ’dres pa).48 
As far as the restrictions of place and nature are concerned, we could say that 
mKhas grub’s explanation coincides with our common sense, for it is well es-
tablished that one and the same thing cannot exist at the same time in different 
places. It also cannot be the case that two things totally share their natures. A 
brown cow, for example, shares with other brown cows the nature of being a 
cow and of being brown, but its body has a different size, the tone of its voice 
is different, etc. The impossibility of sharing time, however, requires some fur-
ther explanation. In my opinion, this is to be understood in accordance with the 
Sautrāntika theory of momentariness that whatever is existent is exclusively 
momentary. For indeed, if it is agreed that every existent arises and ceases at 
every single moment, one and the same thing cannot last for more than one mo-
ment. In the strictest sense, mKhas grub’s example would therefore be inaccu-
rate since we cannot speak of two different moments of a single pillar. But his 
example is understandable in a dGe lugs pa context, since, curiously enough, 
the dGe lugs pas accepted that moments had extension, construing them to be 
units of time like mornings and afternoons, or days and nights.49 Another possi-
ble interpretation of mKhas grub’s example could therefore be that a pillar in 
the morning refers to one unit of its continuum (saṃtāna), which is differenti-
ated from that in the afternoon.  
 In this manner, all these later adoptions of the idea that an object’s existence 
is restricted in terms of place, time and essential nature are aimed at giving the 
specific details of its individuality.  
 Dreyfus (1997) has previously drawn our attention to this definition of the 
individual (svalakṣaṇa) by making the stimulating remark that Dharmakīrti 
considered the svalakṣaṇa to be real because it is an individual in the sense that 
it exists at a particular place and particular time, and that it has a determinate 
essence (deśakālākāraniyata).50 As I have argued in my review article of his 
                     
48 Yid kyi mun sel 33a1f.: snga dro'i ka ba phyi dro med pa dus ma 'dres pa'i don yin 
gyi / … shar la reg pa'i rdzas des nub la ma reg pa lta bu / yul ma 'dres pa'i don yin 
gyi / … khra bo la yod pa'i rang bzhin de ser skya la med pa sogs / rang bzhin ma 'dres 
pa'i don yin gyi /. Cf. also a parallel explanation in rGyal tshab’s Thar lam gsal byed 
45a1–4. 
49 Cf., e.g. Yid kyi mun sel 34b5ff., cited in Yoshimizu (2000: 18 n. 22), and the 
discussions in Tillemans (1995: 884) and Dreyfus (1997: 109–114). 
50 Dreyfus 1997: 69f. 
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book,51 for Dharmakīrti, the svalakṣaṇa’s restricted existence may account for 
its individuality in contrast with the pervading and permanent nature of the 
universal, but it guarantees its reality only under the condition that the individ-
ual is causally efficacious. And our investigation of the historical development 
of the notion of spatiotemporal restriction (deśakālaniyama) now enables us to 
explain how, because of its causal efficacy, the individual came to be identified 
with the real. In brief, we have: y') insofar as the individual (svalakṣaṇa) itself 
is restricted by its cause to a particular place, time and essential nature, the in-
dividual has the causal efficacy to produce an effect through restricting that ef-
fect to a particular place, time and essential nature. Although later Tibetan 
interpreters scarcely pay attention in their discussion of causality to the Indian 
commitments to the idea of spatiotemporal restriction, this idea is originally not 
to be separated from that of causal efficacy. 
5. Concluding analysis 
I would conclude this study by proposing the following analysis of the Sau-
trāntika philosophical system. Given the theory of causality, the idea of spatio-
temporal restriction then serves to positively establish the entire Sautrāntika 
system: 
1) Whatever exists, occupying space and time, is produced (ktaka) or condi-
tioned (saṃskta) by a cause, because spatiotemporal restriction is impossi-
ble without a cause. 
2) A conditioned, individual and impermanent thing is able to produce an ef-
fect through restricting the effect to a particular place and time (deśa-
kālaniyama) in accordance with its own spatiotemporal location. [=x', y' 
and z'] 
3) A pervasive and permanent thing, if it existed, could not produce an effect 
because it would be unable to restrict the effect to a particular place and 
time; this is because it would have no spatiotemporal location of its own. 
From this theory of causality, one can derive the ontological distinction be-
tween the individual and the universal, and thus the theory of momentariness, 
in the following way: 
1) Only the individual (svalakṣaṇa) is causally efficacious (arthakriyāsamar-
tha) and therefore ultimately real (paramārthasat). A pervasive and perma-
                     
51 Yoshimizu 2003a. 
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nent thing such as the universal (sāmānya) is causally inefficacious and 
therefore not existent in reality (asat). 
2) Because a pervasive and permanent or non-momentary thing does not exist 
in reality due to its lack of causal efficacy, all existents are exclusively 
impermanent (anitya) or momentary (kṣaṇika). 
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